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RECENT DECISIONS
from a sister state. Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U. S. 226
(1945). The reluctance of other states to recognize divorce decrees
where there is no domicil, even when a statute of the forum authorizes such a decree, is manifested by numerous cases. E. g., Van
Fossen v. State, 37 Ohio St. 317, 41 Am. Rep. 507 (1881).
The court in the principal case relied heavily on Gould v.
Gauld, 235 N. Y. 14, 138 N. E. 490 (1923), in which the Court of
Appeals recognized a divorce decree from a French court even
though the parties were domiciled in New York. The parties
were residents of France, however, -and the French court had personal jurisdiction over the defendant. Recognition of the French
divorce was apparently by grace of the New York court and the
case does not stand as a precedent in the area of full faith and
credit. Cf. In re Lindgren's Estate, 293 N. Y. 18, 55 N. E. 2d 849
(1944).
The language of C. P. A. § 1147 (2) certainly indicates a decision such as that in the instant case. However, the questionable
validity in other jurisdictions of a New York decree based solely
on Section 1147 (2) may cause this statute to act as a trap for
the unwary plaintiff.
Alan H. Levine
EVIDENCE - EFFECT OF FEDERAL MI-UNITY
STATUTE ON STATE PROCEEDINGS
Defendant's conviction for a violation of Maryland's gambling law was based on self-incriminating evidence given by him
before a congressional committee, although the federal immunity
statute provided that no testimony given by a witness in congressional inquiries "shall be used as evidence in any criminal proceeding against him in any court." 18 U. S. C. § 3486 (1952).
Held: The immunity statute precludes the use of such testimony
by the states. Adams v. Maryland, 347 U. S. 179 (1954).
Statutes granting witnesses immunity against prosecution
have been enacted in order to obtain needed testimony without
violating the privilege against self-incrimination guaranteed by
the 5th Amendment of the Federal Constitution. WIGMVORE,
EVIDENCE, § 2281 (3d ed. 1940). To be granted immunity, the
witness must claim the privilege only if the statute so requires,
United States v. Monia, 317 U. S. 424 (1943), and must be appearing in response to a subpoena. United States v. May, 175 F. 2d
994 (D. C. Cir. 1949).
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It is uniformly held that the privilege against self-incrimination may be constitutionally supplanted by a statute which guarantees the witness complete immunity from federal prosecution
based on the incriminating testimony. Brown v. Walker, 161 U. S.
591 (1896). Statutes which immunize only the use of the incriminating testimony in a subsequent federal proceeding are invalid
since partial immunity cannot replace the privilege. Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U. S. 547 (1892). But, the Constitution does
not require such statutes to provide witnesses with immunity from
prosecution by a state. United States v. Mu.rdock, 284 U. S. 141
(1931). Nor is the 5th Amendment violated by federal prosecution based on incriminating evidence revealed by a witness in a
state proceeding under a state immunity statute. Feldman v.
United States, 322 U. S. 487 (1944). The underlying principle in
the latter cases stems from the traditional interpretation of the
privilege protecting the witness only against the crimes of the juris-

diction in which it is invoked.

WIGMOBF, EVIDENCE

§ 2258 (3d ed.

1940). A contrary view was held in a few early cases, particularly bankruptcy proceedings, In re Feldstein, 103 Fed. 269
(S. D. N. Y. 1900), and cases in which the evidence requested by a
federal grand jury would produce an immediate danger of proseeution by the state in which it was sitting. Ballmann v. Fagin,
200 U. S. 186 (1906); In re Doyle, 42 F. 2d 686 (S. D. N. Y. 1930).
In the instant case the Supreme Court interpreted the words
"in any court" as indicative of a congressional intent to preclude use of incriminating evidence by both federal and state
courts and upheld the federal interference with the police power
of the states on the basis of the "necessary and proper" clause,
U. S. Co rT. Art. I, § 8, and the supremacy clause, U. S. CONST.
Art. VI. It is important to note that the immunity granted as to
the states is to be regarded as a congressional gratuity rather
than a constitutional mandate. Hence, the scope of the immunity
given in regard to state proceedings may be as narrow or as wide
as Congress commands, whereas in the federal jurisdiction, it
must of constitutional necessity be co-extensive with the privilege.
It is interesting to note that, since the instant statute fails to satisfy the latter requirement, the defendant could have validly refused to testify.
Since the decision in the instant case, a new federal immunity
statute, of limited application has been enacted. 68 STAT. 745, 18
U. S. C. A. § 3486 (Supp. 1954). By guaranteeing witnesses full
immunity from prosecution instead of merely prohibiting the use
of incriminating evidence, the statute indicates long-awaited com-
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pliance with the Counselvwn decision, and can be used to compel
a witness to answer.
It would appear that witnesses will be afforded equally-wide
protection from state prosecution, since the new statute retains
the phrase "in any court." Whether this further interference
with state powers raises a constitutional question not answered by
the instant case remains to be seen.
Eileen Tomaka
FEDERAL PROCEDURE - SUBSTITUTION OF A PUBLIC
OFFICIAL UNDER RULE 25 (d) OF THE FEDERAL
RULES OF C1IL PROCEDURE
Petitioner unsuccessfully sought to compel the return of documents illegally seized and now held by the United States Attorney.
The United States Attorney retired, and the court refused to substitute his successor in office on the grounds that this would be an
exercise of original jurisdiction over a new party and a new cause.
Danenbergv. Cohen, 213 F. 2d 944 (7th Cir. 1954).
At common law, an action against a public official abated with
his death or retirement from office and could not be revived against
his successor without statutory authority. In the very cases in
which the Supreme Court recognized this principle, it also recognized the inexpedience of the rule and urged the enactment of
remedial statutory authority. United States ex rel Bernardin v.
Butterworth, 169 U. S. 600 (1898) ; Ex Parte La Prade,289 U. S.

444 (1933).
In response to this judicial prompting, Congress enacted Rule
25 (d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure which provides
for substitution against a successor in office when "a substantial
need for so continuing is satisfactorily shown." The dearth of
cases interpreting "substantial need" necessitates a review of the
Bernardin and La Prade cases, for an indication of judicial interpretation of "substantial need." In the Bernardincase the petitioner requested a writ of mandamus to force the successor in office
to the head of the Patent Bureau to issue him a patent. The
La Pradecase was a suit against The Attorney General of Arizona
to enjoin the enforcement of a statute relating to the size of railroad trains. In both cases the Court was forced to refuse substitution of their successors solely because of the absence, at that
time, of statutory authority. A case decided after the enactment
of statutory authority allowed substitution of a United States tax
collector in a suit to enjoin an unconstitutional collection of an

